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November 11, 1977 Conference
List l, Sheet 4
Motion of Petr for
Appointment of Counsel

No. 77-5353
MINCEY

v.

(

ARIZONA
FACTS:

On October 17 , 1977, the Court granted cert to the

Arizona SC on the questions whether the state's "murder scene exception"

~rrant requirement satisfies the Fourth Amendment and whether a
statement was admissible for impeachment purposes .

The Court also

granted petr's motion to proceed ifp .
CONTENTIONS :

Petr seeks to have Richard Oseran appointed as counseL '

Mr . Oseran is familiar with the case, have represented petr at trial and
on appeal .

He has been an attorney for 7 years, and intends to apply

for admission to the bar of this Court as soon as he receives an application form from the Clerk .
DISCUSSION:

Mr. Oseran appears qualified to competently represent

petr .
ll/l/77
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w-/~~

State/Cr f'mi. ~-~·i--~ • Tim-e~y

ARIZONA
1.

SUMMARY:

and Fifth Amendments.

The issues presented involve the Fourth
The former involves the validity of

Arizona's "murder scene exception" to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment.
__..

---

The latter involves the voluntariness of a

statement which was inadmissible in the prosecution's
case-in-chief under Miranda but was admitted as a prior
inconsistent statement for impeachment purposes.

2.
2.

FACTS:

Petr's convictions grew out of a narcotics

"bust" and ensuing shoot-out in Tucson, Arizona.

On October 28,

1974, undercover agent Heqdricks went to petr's apartment,
ostensibly to buy drugs from petr.

After a deal had been

arranged, Headricks and one other agent left the apartment to
round up several other agents.

Headricks and one other agent

returned to the apartment, supposedly to pay for the drugs; they
were backed up by eight other agents.

When Headricks knocked on

the door and announced that they were police, a man in the
apartment (not petr) tried to slam the door shut.
their
some of the police forced/way into the apartment.
and shots were fired in the bedroom.

At that point,
Tumult ensued,

It turned out that the

shooting had been between petr and Headricks; both men emptied
their guns.

Headricks and petr were taken to the hospital;

Headricks later died.

Several guns were found in the bedroom.

For the next four days, a police investigative team
which had been called by the narcotics agents searched and
) inventoried petr's apartment.

No one obtained a search warrant,

and no reason was given for not seeking one.

Although no one is

sure, the officers apparently learned of Headricks' death after
the search began.
While in the hospital's intensive care unit, petr was
questioned by Officer Hunt.

0

Petr had just come back frm an
A

operation; he was being fed intravenously; he had a tube down his
throat to help him breathe, another tube through his nose into
his stomach to keep him from vomiting, and a catheter to his

3.
bladder.

The testimony was unclear as to the extent of his

medication.

Petr insists that he was drugged (which is quite

plausible considering the other indicators of his condition), but
a nurse testified that petr had not received medication and was
alert.

Petr could not talk and answered by writing notes.
The interrogation began with questions about another

wounded suspect.

Then petr was told that he was charged with

killing a police officer and was given his Miranda warnings.
Several times (petr says 7), petr told the officer. that he did
questions
not want to answer any more /
and wanted to consult with a
\

lawyer.

--

The officer nevertheless continued the interrogation,

stopping only when petr fell asleep or lapsed into

(y

unconsciousness.
Petr was charged with and convicted of first degree
murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and unlawful possession of, .
sale of, and possession with intent to sell, narcotics.

The

s.

Ct. of Arizona reversed the murder and assault convictions for
reasons not here relevant.

It rejected petr's Fourth and Fifth

Amendment contentions, which are the same as those presented in
this petn.
On the Fourth Amendment claim, the court held that there
were no exigent circumstances to justify the failure to obtain a
warrant.

It held that the search was lawful, however, because it

came within the "murder scene exception" to the warrant
requirement, under which "the search of a murder scene under
certain circumstances [is] a valid exception to the

4.

constitutional warrant requirement."

Petn App. 22.

Those

circumstances were further delineated by the court as follows:
"We hold a reasonable, warrantless search of
the scene of a homicide--or of a serious
personal injury with likelihood of death where
there is reason to suspect foul play--does not
violate the Fourth Amendment . . . w.h ere the
law enforcement officers were legally on the
premises in the first instance . . . . For the
search to be reasonable, the purpose must be
limited to determining the circumstances of
death and the scope must not exceed that
purpose. The search must also begin within a
reasonable period following the time when the
officials first learn of the murder (or
potential murder)."

L9. 23.

The court cited .its prior decisons in State v. Duke, 110

Ariz. 320, 518 P.2d 570 (1974); State ex rel. Berger v. Super.
Court, 110 Ariz. 281, 517 P.2d 1277 (1974); and State v. Sample,
1 0 7 Ar i z • 4 0 7 , 4 8 9 P • 2d 4 4 ( 19 71) .

(CA 9 disagreed with the

Arizona position when the Sample case came to it on habeas.
Sample v. Eyeman, 469 F.2d 819 (CA 9 1972) ~ The court also cited
several cases in other states which recognize the murder scene
exception.

See Petn App. 22 n. 4.

As for petr's Fifth Amendment claim, the court held that
though petr 's statements clearly were obtained in violation of

1

Miranda, and therefore could not be admitted as substantive

-

evidence, they passed the voluntariness test o= Oregon v. Hass,

---

420 U.S. 714, and Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, and therefore

could be used to impeach petr's credibility.

The court noted

that the fact that petr could write legibly and "fairly
sensibl[y]" supported a finding of voluntariness.

The S. Ct. was

not swayed by the fact that the trial court had failed to make

5.

(·

findings on the voluntariness of the confession; it reasoned that
since the rule is that confessions are inadmissible even for
impeachment unless they are voluntary, the fact that the trial
court admitted the statements indicated that it had found them
voluntary.
3. CONTENTIONS:
(a) Petr challenges the murder scene
unacceptable,
exception a~given the principle that exceptions to the warrant
be
requirement must/"'jealously and carefully drawn,' and there must
be 'a showing by those who seek exemption . • • that the
exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.'"
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (quoting Jones v.
United States, 357
U.S. 451, 456).
218, 219.

~

u.s.

493, 499; McDonald v. United States, 335

See also Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S.

He notes especially the absence of any justification

for not obtaining a warrant here, and the extended and intrusive
nature of the search.

He also notes the explicit conflict

between Arizona's position and that of the Ninth Circuit.
{b) •

Petr contends that his statements from his

hospital bed were not in fact inconsistent with his testimony at
trial, and therefore were not admissible for impeachment t
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171; and that even if they were
inconsistent, they were not voluntary.
4.

DISCUSSION:

contentions have merit.

I believe that both of petr's
The murder scene exception is novel, and

the Arizona court has not given much justification for it.

The

state does not attempt to justify the exception on its merits;

(

6.
rather, it turns novelty into a reason against granting cert by
urging the Court to wait until the doctrine has undergone further
development and refinement in the state courts.

(The state notes

that each time the Arizona S. Ct. has discussed the exception, it
has given it a narrower interpretation.)

But the Ninth Circuit

already has disapproved the exception, in the very first Arizona
case to apply it: and the Arizona S. Ct. cites six states that

I

have adopted the exception (Alaska, California, Delaware, Maine,

Vermont, and Wyoming) and one that has not (Colorado).
22 n. 4.

Petn App.

This seems enough development to permit review.
The Arizona court almost surely was wrong in its

( application of the voluntariness standard.
so bad as to render him particularly

Petr's condition was

inc~pable

pressure; if that were not enough, his repeated

of resisting
reques~

to have

the interrogation cease and to confer with a lawyer indicate
that he did not speak voluntarily.

Furthermore, I tend to agree

with petr that his statements were not really inconsistent with
his testimony at trial.

(The statements are set out in the

response at 22-25.)
The state's response is unpersuasive.

It contends that

the search was lawful because petr could not legitimately claim
an expectation of privacy in an apartment that had just been the
scene of a gun battle with the police: that application of a
se unreasonableness rule (because

~f

~£

the ab{ sence of a warrant)

would produce the anomalous result of invalidating a "patently
reasonable [search] under all the circumstances": and, as noted

7.

(

above, that because of "the limited experience of the courts in
this unique area [the murder scene exception], it would be
premature for the Court to intervene at this time."
4-5.

Response at

On the Miranda point, the state responds that the degree of

inconsistency goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of the
prior statements; that the lucidity of petr's written responses
indicates voluntariness and trustworthiness; that the
interrogating officer testified that petr never lapsed into
unconsciousness; and that "other than the mention of a lawyer on
several occasions", petr did not indicate that he wanted the
questioning to cease.
~

There is a rsponse.
~
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I write to invite your attention to the br ef for
the respondent, file~January 5 by the Attorney General
Arizona.
:i

~~·

·~

briefs in this
weekend, I note that the · appendix incJ uded :d n the state •.: s
br f ef does not comply in any respect with o ur Rules.
,
Indeed, much of it is ,i .llegibile. ·
if';

'~

l

I·

.

"'

",1.

,.,,

·)'i' ~

'

~

The brief aJso is an example of t he need for some
limitation on the length of the briefs. In this
uncomplicated case ; the brief is 121 pages long exclusive
of the appendix. , It includes; ad nauseaum, excerpts .from
the tes~ i.mony.
· "
tl;. am sending a copy of th i s letter: to members of
the Court for their information : I believe, however, that
you have authority' . to reject briefs .that fai 1 to comply
with the Rules. As this case is set for argument on
Febr-uary 21, •~; I suppose it is too J ate to reject the brief
.without more. ,
.
'·
.
·
•' f.

'~··

~~ ~:·"

•

'''&:~~·

. .
Subject to the approval of the Ch i ef Justice (or
the vi.e'ws of other members of the Court) , I suggest that
you advise the Attorney General of Arizona that his brief
will be rejected unless he submits, by some date you
the appendix in a . form compatible w.i th our Rules.
w

~
;

~

~.

copies""'"·: to
LFP/lab

BOB-TAIL BENCH MEMO
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Feb. 13, 1978

Nancy

RE:

No. 77-5353, Mincey v. Arizona

I believe the S o Ct. of Arizona should be reversed on
both questions presented.
I o The Search

-

-

The search of petr's apartment took place in four
stages, as described by the State.
•

with the

We are concerned primarily

f~geso The ~

lasted from lasted from

about 3:30 p.m. on the day of the shoot-out until the early ~~~
morning if hours of the next day.

During this phases the

police went through every nook and cranny of the

rr-

~partment,

and seized a syringe from the bedroom; identification found
in petr's wallet, which was found inside a pocket of a jacket

-.

in the bedroom (and where the jacket was found is not stated);
14 papers containing heroin, which were found in the same
jacket pocket; and some more heroin paraphernalia from the
same pocket and from the bathroom (exact location unspecified).

The ~nd ~ of the search lasted for

aRK

another three

days or so, when the police found various lead fragments.
Resp seeks to justify the warrantless search on the
basis of Arizona's "murder scene" exception to the warrant
requirement.

Arizona's exception is far broader than any of

---...

the so-called exceptions in other states on which the Arizona
S. Ct. relied.

See App o 111 n. 4.

I have read all the other

states' cases, and although some of them are not completely
explicit about it, they rely basically on the exception to
t(

,\

the warrant requirement when there ar~ exigent circumstances. ~
They do speak of the importance of solving a murder because
societal
of the great/interest in apprehending murderers and protecting
victims, but this usually has been in the context of justifying
an entry onto the premises and a hurried search through
them o In several of the cases the evidence seized was in plain
view.

But mostly, the decisions talk about the need for

immediate ppR police action and the consequent inability to
\ get a warrant.

In some of these cases, it may be that the

circumstances really were not exigent, but at least the theory
of these cases has been within the confines of an established
to
exception/the warrant requirement.
Arizona, on the other hand, has been explicit in saying
that the murder scene exception is a distinct exception.

I this

case the Arizona

s.

In

Ct. was explicit in saying that the

search was not incident to an arrest (because petr already was

____ ___

...._ exigent.

in custody) and that the circumstances

(This

was apparent from the fact that almost everyone in the
apartment had been injured, and the police had the apartment
sealed off immediately after the shooting.)

This was consistent

with the court's earlier opinion in State v. Sample, 489 P.2d
44, 46-47 (Ariz o 1971), where the court justified a warrantless
search of a mobile home by an officer who returned to the
scene of the crime after arresting the suspect:
"This was not a
__ . search incident to a
lawful arrest, as the defendant was already under
arrest and in custody. • • o Nor is it supported
by 'exigent' circumstances or the necessity of
preserving destructible evidence o • . o The evidence
is also clear that a magistrate was available and
that [the officer] could have easily obtained a
search warrant before returning to the mobile home."
Why a special exception to the warrant requirement is
necessary under such circumstances is beyond me o Indeed, the
CA 9 held the search in Sample unconstitutional when the
issue was raised in a habeas corpus proceeding.

Sample v.

Eyman, 469 F o2d 819 (CA9 1972) (Ely, Renfrew [dj]; Jertberg,
dissenting).

(The dissenting judge did not state any reasons

but simply said he agreed with the Arizona

s.

Ct.'s resolution

of the issues.)

I

re~lly

In short, the "murder scene" exception in most states
is a variant or aspect of the exigency exception o

When exigent circumstances do not exist, there are no legitimate
reasons for carving out an exception to the warrant requirement o
In one of the state cases it was suggested that the police
could not present to the magistrate a specific description of
what they were looking for,

and that they-. could not establish

probable cause for the search.

The court's words are worth

quoting:
"As to obtaining a warrant to search and seize, no
officer couMhave supplied the requisite factual
affidavit • • • • Although the officers reasonably
entertained a lively suspicion or 'hunch' that death
had been caused by an assailant, they could not
recite facts which would support a finding of probable
cause to believe a crime had been committed. Moreover,
it was impossible to describe with any specificity
whatever the weapon to be searched for or to assert
that there was any reason to believe that such
unidentifiable weapon could be found upon the premises."
State v. Chapman, 250 A. 2d 203, 211 (Me. 1969).

As for the

probable cause point, I find it hard to believe that a
magistrate would conclude that there was an absence of it
when the police reported they'd found a body and the cause
of death was unexplained .

(In Chapman the victim had been

struck with a blunt object, and the husband of the victim told
the police some confused and inconsistent stories.)

As for

specificity, I think a magistrate would accept it if the police
said they were searching for the object(s) that caused or
contributed to the victim's death, or explained the daath.
If necessary, it would be better to relax the needed specificity
when dealing with an apparent murder as to which there were

---------------------------------------no
clues than to dispense entirely with the warrant requirement.
It might be argued that if magistrates regularly will be
likely to grant warrants when a murder is involved, there is
no point in going through the formalities; but the warrant
requirement was conveived of as a necessary formality, to
interpose the detatched magistrate between the police and the
citizens .

II.

The Statements

I do not think petr's statements from the hospital
bed can be said to have been voluntary.

Their reliability

was substantially diminished by petr's obviously helpless
and confused condition.

It is quite unsettling to read

the account of the questioning.
It also seems to me that petr's two statements
arguably were not inconsistent with his trial testimony,
but I do not think the Court needs to address or rely on
this point.

If petr had been in normal condition and made

the statements voluntarily, the
degree of inconsistency would affect the
weight, not the admissibility, of the statements.

N.B.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON , D . C . 20543

February 16, 1978

MEMORANDUM TO MR.. JUSTICE POWELL
RE:

Mincey v. Arizona, No. 77-5353

In reply to your communication of February 6,
1978, concerning the above-captioned case, I too was
not pleased when I received the brief for the respondent.
However, upon a close examination of the brief, I found
that much of the appendix thereto, which was not properly
printed under Rule 39, was superfluous.
Most of the material reproduced in the appendix
to the brief is legibly printed either in the body of the
respondent's brief itself, properly printed as part of the
appendix record, or as part of the appendix to the brief
of petitioner. I realize that it is not up to you or the
other Justices to figure out which is irrelevant or which
is part of some other printed brief or record filed in the
case.
I spoke to William J. Schafer, III, Chief Counsel
in the Criminal Division, and called the matter to his
attention. He agreed that the brief was poorly printed
but that he was out of the city at that time conducting a
trial. He did not see the brief until he returned to his
office. Mr. Schafer advised me that he would take such
corrective measures as the Court may suggest or direct.
This being an in forma pauperis case, both the
brief of the petitioner and the appendix record were
printed under the supervision of this office.

cc:

Chief Justice
Associate Justices

~(f--~)
T~

q :

~~~,,~

~ ~~~.-,~tJ~A..,;~~, ... Q/,.o ·tp~

4.

~ 2. ""::!~ q I P-ep;; ~4-!-,._, ~
~~~~~- .
(h_

5-t.~~.Lo~
4'1~ ... ---t....- ~~ - .ttc ... #" ~ ...., "'
~ c..,.....,..... ~.-L ........ c:: .. .....,_
4

W~(a-r-A-.6-~ ~~~
/> I
~ ~ •'~~~~~
~ ... ·... ~ ..-..~... ./..... I ~ ~ ''1/1(
~

~ ~~~ 4-Le'~

......

1

Mr. Justice White

~

)

~t" ~ ~

<c.-d. 10 ~
~~.~~ . ~~
"'2--

~~~~~~~
~~~~ . .
~~~~~~

Mr. Justice Marshall

~

----·------~--·--------

~ __. -f/t-1- 1-.J ~ ~ ~
~.

"Z<..o ~~~ k

· A-!r A...t.u..t_ k
/2,...-&:l(z.,...J. &.;..:::1

--------Mr. Justice

~~?

~ c;n:~

/,.4.-4AA , _ '

------·---'"- -------.-- ·---

~-----,~-------~
·

Blackmun

.

~

...

....

Mr. Justice Powell ~
----~

)

a?~ C<- ~ P~ c:= .

'1ttJ.

~~~~~~.

7L-A-~~~~~

~1ii.u.4C"&I ~ ~~ ~
~ ~ ~

IAAJ

•

~lfl...c..co£~4"""

.~~~-~~~~

~... ~~~...._.l~ £A.·e~~ .. ~, ,.JJ~
,_,;/-- ~ ~ ~ .nu._~ "4c....(_,.

-

'--

9

~~~.....:{-~~ ~~

~ ~ ~ C!-~~4JI'-u\..

Hr. Justice Rehnquist

~jt.~~.,. vf S"/d Ufu,+<i,..,.

~~k.U_~~
.-~~~~~.~~
~~I<~ '-a a~~~

~·

?)

l-q. ~

~if~

)

~ ...- ·~~~~'-~( J .. ~~~
J-L-t ~..., ~ .Lo ~ d- ~ ~l.e6 ~/,

~ <!-~~~~ .

J

~--Mr.

2.,J-~~~~

W-t-~ ~~

.LA.-..,-<-C,.te-J.--J, ....

"'f

~S/c..t--td~~k~~
Jus i:iCeSteV.e ns

-~-----------------·-

- ------ ----- -

~~~~~

~~~-~~)c.£«~
~ ( J ~ w..~4.c..c£.J ,Lo ·~~,)

~P?•C&t..-~~~
~~.~~,.... - ~~~
Tk ~.; '1-~ 4--/. &>:~ ~ ~ .
Lt....,_.
<JJ- ~ as gn ~&~~ .. , ~
~~..,...~~J4./JL -1-. :. ..( . 74
--<-- ~ 1-t. : ,__, ,
4,

.. '
,

..

c__r. f
To: The
Mr.
Mr .
Mr .

Chief Jubt.ice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
~r. Justice Blackmun
/ Mr. Justice Powell
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Mr. Justice Stevens

From: Mr. Justice Stewart
Circulat ed:

1st DRAFT

1 6 MAY 1978

.
Rec1rculated:

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ~

¢"

No. 77-5353

I

Rufus Junior Mincey, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to
v.
the Supreme Court of
State of Arizona.
Arizona.
[May -, 1978]

MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
On the afternoon of October 28, 1974, undercover police
officer Ba.r ry Headricks of the Metropolitan Area Narcotics
Squad knocked on the door of an apartment in Tucson, Ariz.,
occupied by the petitioner, Rufus Mincey. Earlier in the day,
Officer Headricks had allegedly arranged to purchase a quantity of heroin from Mincey and had left, ostensibly to obtain
money. On his return he was accompanied by nine other
plainclothes policemen and a deputy county attorney. The
door was opened by John Hodgman, one of three acquaintances
of Mincey who were in the living room of the apartment.
Officer Headricks slipped inside and moved quickly into the
bedroom. Hodgman attempted to slam the door in order to
keep the other officers from entering. but was pushed back
against the wall. As the police entered the apartment, a rapid
volley of shots was heard from the bedroom. Officer
Headricks emerged and collapsed on the floor. When other
officers entered the bedroom they found Mincey lying on the
floor. wounded and semiconscious. Officer Headricks died a
few hours later in the hospital.
The petitioner was indicted for murder. assault/ and three
counts of narcotics oft'enses. He was tried at a single trial and
1

The assault charge was based on t.he wounding of a person in the living;

1-oom who was hit by a bullet t hat came through the wall.

,I
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convicted on all the charges. At his trial and on appea.I. he
contended that evidence used against him had been unlawfully
seized from his apartment without a warrant and that statements used to impeach his credibility were inadmissible
because they had not been made voluntarily. The Arizona
Supreme Court reversed the murder and assault convictions on
state-law grounds, 2 but affirmed the narcotics convictions. 115
Ariz. 472, 566 P. 2d 273. It held that the warrantlAss search
of a homicide scene is permissible under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments and that Mincey's statements were
voluntary. We granted certiorari to consider these substantial
constitutional questions. - U. S. - .

I
The first question presented is whether the search of
Mincey's apartment was constitutionally permissible. After
the shooting, the narcotics agents, thinking that other persons
in the apartment might have been injured, looked about
quickly for other victims. They found a young woman
wounded in the bedroom closet and Mincey apparently unconscious in the bedroom, as well as Mincey's three acquaintances
(one of whom had been wounded in the head) in the living
room. Emergency assistance was requested and some medical
aid administered to Officer Headricks. But the agents refrained from further iuvestigation. pursuant to a Tucson
Police Department directive that police officers should not
· investigate incidents in which they are involved. They neither
searched further nor seized any evidence; they merely guarded
the suspects and the premises.
Within 10 minutes. however, homicide detectives who had
heard a radio report of the shooting arrived and took charge
2 The 8tat.e a.ppellate court. h<:>ld that the jury ha.d been improperly
instructed on crimina.! intent.. Tt a.pprars from the record in this case
that. the retrial of the petition<:>r on the murdrr and assault charges waa
1;1ta¥ed b~r the tr~a.l cqurt. after cert.~orari was gr:mtrd by this Court.

: rr,. '...
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of the investigation. They supervised the removal of Officer Headricks and the suspects. trying to make sure that the
scene was disturbed as littlE' as possible, and then proceeded to
gather evidence. Their search lasted four days,u during which
period the entire apartment was searched, photographed, and
diagrammed. The officers opened drawers, closets, and cupboards, and inspected th0ir contents; they emptied clothing
pockets; they dug bullet fragments out of the walls and floors;
they pulled up sections of the carpet and removed them for
examination. Every item in the apartment was closely examined and inventoried. and two to three hundred objects were
seized. In short, Mincey's apartment was subjected to an
exhaustive and intrusive search. No warrant was ever
obtained.
The petitioner's pretrial motion to suppress the fruits of
this search was denied after a hearing. Much of the evidence
introduced against. him at trial (including photographs and
diagrams, bullets and shell casings. guns, narcotics, and narcotics paraphernalia) was thE' product of the four-day search
of his apartment. On appeal. the Arizona Supreme Court
reaffirmed previous decisions in which it had held tha.t the
warrantless search of the scene of a homicide is constitutionally permissible. 4 It stated its ruling as follows:
"We hold a reasonable. warrantless search of the scene of
a homicide-or of a serious personal injury with likelihood of death where there is reason to suspect foul play:J The police abo returned to the a partment in November 1974, at the
rcque:-;1. of the petitioner's landlord, to remove property of the> petit.ioner
that. remnin<:>d in the apartment after· his lease had expired on October 31.
·I State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 489 P. 2d 44 ; State ex rel. B el'ger v.
S·uperior Coul't , 110 Ariz . 281, 517 P . 2d 1277 ; State v. Duke, 110 Ariz .
a20, 518 P. 2d 570. Tlw Court of Appeal~ fO'r the> Ninth Circuit rever;;ed
tlw denia.l of a petrtion for a writ of habrnH corpus filed by the defendant
whose conviction was upheld in State v. Sample, supra, on th(' ground ,
inter alia, that the warmntle;;s search of the homicide ;;cene violated tho
.fo~trth and. Folu·teenth Amendmmts. Sample v. Eyman, 469 F . 2d 819.

f

I

{

l
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does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution where the law enforcement officers
were legally on the premises in the first instance. . . .
For the search to be reasonable. the purpose must be
limited to determining the circumstances of death and the
scope must not exceed that purpose. The search must
also begin within a reasonable period following the time
when the officials first lea.rn of the murder (or potential
murder)." 115 Ariz., at 482,566 P. 2d, at 283.
Since the investigating homicide detectives knew that Officer
Headricks was seriously injured. began the search promptly
upon their arrival at the apartment, and searched ouly for
evidence either establishing thE' circumstances of death or
"relevant to motiv() and intent or knowledge (narcotics, e. g.),"
id., a.t 483, 566 P. 2d, at 284, the court found that the warrant'less search of the petitioner's apartment had not violated the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
We cannot agree. The Fourth Amendment proscribes all
unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that "searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approva.l by judge or magistrate. are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to
a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351; see also Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., - - U. S. - , - (slip op. 4-5); Michigan v.
Tyler,- U.S.-.- (slip op. 6); Cool1'dge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 481; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U. S. 523. 528- 529·. The Arizona Supreme Court did not hold
that the search of the petitioner's apartment fell within any
of the exceptions to the warrant requirement previously recognized by this Court. but rather that the search of a homicide
scene should be recognized as an additional except!9.n. Several reasons are advanced by the State to meet its "burden ...
to show the existence of such an exceptional situation " as to·
j ustify creating .a new exception to the warrant requirement_

T
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See Vale v. Louisia:na, 399 U.S. 30, 34; Jeffers Y. United States,
342 U. S. 48, 51. None of t.hese reasons. however. persuades
us of the validity of the generic exception delineated by the
Arizona Supreme Court.
The first contention is that the search of the petitioner's
apartment did not invade any constitutionally protected right
of privacy. See Katz v. United States, supra. This argument
appears to have two prongs. On the one hand, the State
urges that by shooting Officer Headricks iu his apartment,
Mincey forfeited any reasonable expectation of privacy. We
have recently rejected a similar waiver argument in Michigan,
v. Tyler, supra, at (slip op. 5-6); it suffices here to say
that this reasoning would impermissibly convict the suspect
even before the evidence against him was gathcred. 5 On the
other hand, the State contends that the police entry to arrest
Mincey was so great an invasion of his privacy that the additional intrusiou caused by the search was constitutionally
irrelevant. But this claim is hardly tenable in light of the
extensive nature of this search. It is one thing to say that
one who is legally taken into police custody has a lessened
right of privacy in his person. Se~ United States v. Edwards,
415 U. S. 800. 808-809: United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S.
218. It is quite another to argue that he also has a lessened
right of privacy in his entire house. Indeed this very argument was rejected when it was advauced to support the
warrantless search of a dwelling where an arrest occurred as
"incident" to the arrest of its occupant. Chirnel v. California,
395 U. S. 752, 766 n. 12. Thus, this search cannot be justified
on the ground that no constitutionally protected right of
privacy was invaded.
Moreover, this rationale would UP inapplicable if a homicide occurred
at the home of the victim or of :1 :otranger, yet. the Arizona ca~es indicate
tlutt. a. warrant]e:;i:i search in ~ uch :1 ea:;e would abo be permi:;:;ible under
the ·'murder scrne f'XCPption." Cf. State v. Sample, supra, at 409, 48!}
r.

P . 2d 1 at 46.

I
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The State's second argument iu support of Arizona's categorical exception to the warrant requirement is tha.t a possible homicide presents an emergency situation demanding
immediate action. We do not question the right of the police
to respo_12_d to emergency situations. Numerous state 11 and
federal 7 cases nave recognized that the Fourth Amendment
does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries
and searches when they reasonably believe that a. person
within is in need of immediate aid. Similarly, when the police
come upon the scene of a homicide they may make a prompt
warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims
or if a killer is still on the premises. Cf. Michigan v. Tyler,
supra, at (slip op. 9-10). "The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would
otherwise be illegal conduct absent an exigency or emergency."
Wayne v. United States, 115 U. S. App. D. C. 234. 241, 318
F. 2d205, 212 (opinion of Burger, J.).
But a warrantless search must be "strictly circumscribed by
6

E. g., People Y. Hill. 12 Cal. 3d 731, 52R P. 2d 1; Patrick v. State, 227
A. 2d 486 (Del. 1967): People v. Brooks, 7 Illl. App. 3d 767, 289 N. E.
2d 207; Maxey v. State, 244 N. E. 2d 650 (Ind.); Davis Y. ~tate, 23(i Md.
389. 204 A. 2d 7G; ~tate\'. Hardin, 518 P. 2d 151 (Nev.); State v. Gosser,
50 N .•T. 438, 23G A. 2d 377; People v. Mitchell, 89 N.Y. 2d 17:3, 347 N. E.
2d 607; State v. Pires, 55 Wi:s. 2d 597, 201 N. W. 2d 153. Other casr;; are
collectrd in Notr. The Emergency Doctrine, Civil Search and Seizure, and
the Fourth Amendment, 4:~ Ford. L. Rev. 571, 584 11. 12. See alHo ALI
Modrl Codr of Pre-arraignml'nt Proredurr § SS 2()0.5 (Prop. Off. Draft
1975) . By citing thr~e ea:><'t< and tho~e in the notr following, of cour ·e,
we do not mran to approvr 1.he sprcifir holding" of earh CHH('.
7 E . g., Root v. Ga'Uper, 438 F. 2d a111, 364-8G5 (CAS); United States v.
Barone, 330 F. 2cl 54;~ (CA2); Wayne v. United 8tates. 115 lT. S. App.
D . C. 234, 23R-24:3, :w~ F. 2d 205, 209-214 (opinion of Bmgc>r, .T.);
United States \". Jame~;. 408 F. Supp. 527 (SD Aii:sH.) ; United 8tates ex
rel. Parson v. Anderson, ;~54 F. Supp. 10()0, 10~6-10H7 (Del.), aff'd, 481
F . 2cl 94 (CA3) ; ::;er "J!Varden Y. Hayden. 8H7 U.S. 294, 298-299; McDonald v. United States, ~~35 U. S. 451, 456; Johnson \'. United States, 33:$
u. s. 10, 14-15.
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the exigencies which justify its initiation." Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1, 25-26,s and it simply cannot be contended that this
search was justified by any emergency threatening life or limb.
All the persons in Mincey's apartment had been located before
the investigating homicide officers arrived there and began
their search. And a four-day search that included opening
dresser drawers and ripping up carpets can hardly be rationalized in terms of the legitimate concerns that justify an emergency search.
Third, the State points to the vital public interest in the
prompt investigation of the extremely serious crime of murder. No one can doubt the importance .of this goal. But
the public interest in the investigation of other serious crimes
is comparable. If the warrantless search of a homicide scene
is reasonable, why not the warrantless search of the scene of a
rape, a robbery, or a burglary? "No consideration relevant
to the Fourth Amendment suggests any point of rational limitation" of such a doctrine. Chimel v. California, supra, at
766.
Moreover, the mere fact that law enforcement may be made
more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the
Fourth Amendment. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampsh,;re, 403
U. S., at 481. The investigation of crime would always be
simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth
Amendment reflects the view of those who wrote the Bill of
Rights that the privacy of a person's home and property may
not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity
in enforcement of the criminal law. See United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 6-11. For this reason, warrants are
generally required to search a. person's home or his person
unless "the exigencies of the situation'' make the needs of law
8

The police may of cour;:;e, Heize evidence that is in plain view during
the course of their err1 1mate emer"'enc · ac .Jvi 1es.
.w !gan v. yler.
U. . - , (slip op . 9); <C'oo/i([rge v. Ne·u: Hwr.n.pshi.te, 403 U. S.

443', 46\5-46;6't
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enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is
objectively reasonable und~r the Fourth Amendment. M cDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456; Johnson v. United
States, 333 U. S. 10, 14-15. See, e. g., Chimel v. California,
supra (search of arrested suspect and area within his control
for weapons or evidence); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294,
298-300 ("hot purs!}it." of fleeing suspect); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 770--771 (imminent destruction of evidence); see also supra, at 6-7.
Except for the fact that the offense under investigation was
a homicide, there were no exis ent circumstances in this ca~e,
as, indeed, the Arizona Supreme Court recognized. 115 Ariz.,
at 482, 566 P. 2d, at 283. · There was no indication that evidence would be lost, destroyed or removed during the time
required to obtain a search warrant. Indeed, the police guard
a
artment minimized that possibility. And a search
warrant could eas1 y and convemen y ave been obtained.
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1444 (C) (Supp. 1973). We
decline to hold that the seriousness of the offense under inveatigation itself crea.tes ·exigent circumstances of the kind that
under the Fourth Amendment justify a warrantless search.
Finally, the State argues that the "murder scene exception''
is constitutionally permissible because it is narrowly confined
by the guidelines set forth in the decision of the Arizona
Supreme Court, see supra, at 3-4.n In light of the extensive
search that took place in this case it may be questioned what
protection the guidelines afford a person in whose home a
homicide or assault occurs. Indeed, these so-called guidelines
are hardly so rigidly confining as the State seems to assert.
They confer unbridled discretion upon the individual officer
to interpret such terms as "reasonable ... search,''' "serious
The State abo relies on the fact that ob~ervancc of these guidelines can
be enforced by ft. motion to :suppress evidence. But. the Fourth Amendment "is designed to prevent, not :simply to redre:s;;, unlawful police a,ction ."
Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 766 n. 12.
0

7
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personal injury with likelihood of death where there is reasoH
to suspect foul pla.y," and "reasonable period." It is precisely
this kind of judgmental assessment of the reasonableness and
scope of a proposed search that the Fourth Amendment requires be made by a neutral aud objective magistrate, not a
police officer. See United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 9.
It may well be that the circumstances described by the
Arizona Supreme Court would usually be constitutionally
sufficient to warrant a search of substantial scope. But the
Fourth Amendment requires that this judgment in each case
be made in the first instance by a neutral magistrate.
"The point of the Fourth Amendment. which often is
not grasped by zealous officers. is not that it denies law
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged
by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, supra,
at 13-14.
In sum, we hold that the "murder scene exception" created
by the Arizona Supreme Court is inconsistent with the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments-that the warrantless search of
Mincey's apartment was not constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide had recently occurred there. 10

II
Since there will presumably be a new trial in this case, 11 it
is appropriate to consider also the petitioner's contention that
statements he made from a hospital bed were involuntary, and
To what extrnt the rviclcnce found during this ;;cnrch rna~· have bren
permissibly tieized undrr establi:;hed Fourth AmPnclmrnt titandards will
be for the Arizona court~ to rr:<olvc on rcma.nd.
11 See aJ~;o n . 2, supra.
10
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therefore could not constitutionally be used against him at
his trial.
Mincey was brought to the hospital after the shooting and
taken immediately t.o the emergency room where he was
examined and treated. He had sustained a wound in his hip,
resulting in damage to the sciatic nerve and partial paralysis
of his right leg. Tubes were inserted into his throat to help
him breathe, and through his nose into his stomach to keep
him from vomiting; a catheter was inserted into his bladder
through his penis. He received various drugs, and a. needle
and tube were placed in his arm so that he could be fed intravenously. He was then taken to the intensive care unit.
At about eight o'clock that evening, Detective Hust of the
Tucson Police Department came to the intensive care unit to
interrogate him. Mincey was unable to talk because of the
tube in his mouth, and so he responded to Detective Rust's
questions by writing answers on pieces of paper provided by
the hospital. 12 Hust told Mincey he was under arrest for the
murder of a police officer, gave him the warnings required by
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, and began to ask questions
about the events that had taken place in Mincey's apartment
a few hours earlier. Although Mincey asked repeatedly that
the interrogation stop until he could get a lawyer, Hust continued to question him until almost midnight.
After a pretrial hearing. see Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368,
the trial court found that Mincey had responded to this interroga.tion voluntarily. 13 When Mincey took the witness stand
12
Becau~P of the wa.y in which tlw intrrrogation was conducted, the only
contemporaneous rPrord con~isted of Minrpy's writtPn answer~. Hu~t testifiPd that the next dn~· he went over thi~ docHmPnt and made a few notes
to help ]urn reconstruct the conversation. In n written report dated nbout
a week later, Hu~t transcribed Minrry's nnswrrs and addPd the questions
he behPved hr had a~ked. It wns tin~ written report that was used to
cro:;~-Pxamiup Mince~· nt his subsequent. trial.
1 '1 The trial court made no findings of fact, nor did it make a specific
finding of voluntarjne:,;s, and the rwtitionc·r contends thnt ,admission of the
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a.t his trial his statements in l'<'sponse to Detective Rust's
questions were used in an effort to impeach his testimony in
several respects.'' On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court
indicated its belief that because Detective Hust had failed to
honor Mincey's request for a lav,·yer, the statements would
have been inadmissible as part of the prosecution's ca.se in
chief. Miranda v. Arizona, supra. But, relying on Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222. aud Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714,
it held that since the trial court's fiuding of voluntariness was
not "clear[ly] and manifestrly] '' erroneous the statements
were properly used for purposes of impeachment. 115 Ariz.,
at 479-480, 566 P. 2d, at 280--281.
Statements made by a defendant in circumstances violating
the strictures of Miranda Y. Arizona, supra, are admissible for
impeachment if their "trustworthiness ... satisfies legal stand, ards." Harris v. New York, supra, at 224; Oregon v. Hass,
supra, at 722. But any criminal trial use against a defendant
of his involuntary statemeut. is a denial of due process of law
statements th<.'r<:>fore violated Jackson v. Denno, il7g U. S. 368. We agree
with the Anzona Supreme Court, bowt>vrr, that the finding of voluntarine;s "appearr>;l from thr record with unmiHtakable clarity." Sims v.
Georgia, 385 U. S. 5ilR. 544. Thr pc·titioner had originall~· moved to
suppress hio; written an:-;wer~ to Rust'~ questions on two grounds: that
they had brm rlicited in violnt.ion of Miranda "· Arizona, 384 U. S. 436,
and that thry had been involuntary. During thr !waring. th€' pro~f'cution
stipulatrd that th€' an:,;wrr~ would hP u:,;rd only to imprach thr ]Wtitioner
if hr took thr witnr~s stand. An~· violation of Miranda thus bf'came
irrrlrvant. OrPgon v. !lass. 420 n. S. 714; llarris "· Nev: York, 401 U.S.
222. Tlw trstimony and the bripf:,; and argumPntH of roun~rl werr thrrf'aftrr dirrctrd sol<:>ly to whrt lwr t hr answPrs bad be<'l1 volunt nrily givrn,
and thr court :specifieall~· ruled tha.t thp~· would b<' admis:siblr for impPachment JHlrpo,.;~ on!~·. The eourt thu~ nrer~Raril~· held that ~Iinrey'~ rPHpon,.;r::; to Hu~:<t 'o; mterrogation wrrr Yoluntary.
11 In hght of our holding that \linrf'y 's hospitnl statrment~ wrr<' not
voluntarily given, it is unner~~a~· to rrach hi::< alternatP content.ion that
lhrir u,.;r against him was impermi~siblr brcau,;p thry wrrr not ~ufficiently
lt1cons.btrnt with his trial testimony.

r

77-5353-0PINION
MINCEY v. ARIZONA

''even though there is ample evidence aside from the confession to support the conviction." Jackson v. Denno, supra, at
377; Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503. 518; Lynumn v.
Illinois, 372 U. S. 528, 537; Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181,
190; see Chapman v. Californ/a, 386 U. S. 18, 23 and n. 8.
If, therefore, Mincey's statements to Detective Rust were not
"the product of a rat:onal intellect and a free will," Townsend
v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 307; Blackburn'"· Alabama, 361 U. S.
199, 208, his conviction cannot stand. In making this critical
determination, we are not bound by the Arizona Supreme
Court's holding that the statements were voluntary. Instead,
this Court is under a duty to make an independent evaluation
of the record. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U. S. 737, 741742; Haynes v. Washington, supra, at 515-516.
It is hard to imagine a situa.tion less conducive to the exercise of "a rational intellect and a free will" than Mincey's.
He had been seriously wounded just a few hours earlier, and
had arrived at the hospital "depressed almost to the point of
coma,'' according to his attending physician. Although he
had received some treatment, his condition a.t the time of
Rust's interrogation was still sufficiently serious that he was
in the intensive care unit.' 5 He complained to Rust tha.t the
pain in his leg was "unbearable." He was evidently confused
and unable to think clearly about either the events of that
afternoon or the circumstances of his interrogation. since some
of his written answers were on their face not entirely
cohcrent.'n Finally, while Mincey was being questioned he
tr• A nu:-se testified at the suppre::;!:iion hearing tha.t. the device used to
aid ,vlinrC'y'o; n~piration was reservC'd for "more critical" patients . Moreo·.·pr. ::vlincey apparrntly remained hoo;pitalized for almoo;t a month after
thP shooting. According to docket entrie:s in the trial court hi:s arraignment wa~ po:stponed several times becau!:ie he wa~ still in the hospital; he
wa!:i not :ura igned until November 26, 1974.
'"For example, two of the anRwers written by Mincey were: ''Do you
me Did he give me :some money (no)" and "Ever~· body know E-·err
hod~· ." And Mincey app:uentl~· believed he was bring que:stioned by :srv-

lA
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was lying on his back on a hospital bed, encumbered by tubes,
needles, and breathing apparatus. He was, in short, "at the
complete mercy" of Detective Hust, unable to escape or resist
the thrust of Rust's interrogation. Cf. Beecher v. Alabama,
389 U.S. 35, 38.
In this debilitated and helpless condition, Mincey clearly
expressed his wish not to be interrogated. As soon as Rust's
questions turned to the details of the afternoon's events,
Mincey wrote: "This is all I can say without a lawyer." Hust
nonetheless continued to question him, and a nurse who was
present suggested it would be best if Mincey answered. Mincey gave unresponsive or uninformative answers to several
more questions, and then said again that he did not want to
talk without a lawyer. Hust ignored tha.t request and another
made immediately thereafter.,; Indeed, throughout the inera! different. policemen, not Hu:;t alone; although it wa~ Hu~t who told
Mincey he had killed a policeman, la.ter in the interrogation Mincey
indica.ted he tJ10u~ht it w:1s somronr el~r.
17 In his reconstruction of the interrogation, ~ee u. 12, supra, Hust
statrd that , aJtrr he m;krd iVJincey some qurstion~ to try to ident if~· one
of the other victim:;, thr following en"ued:
''HUST: ... What do you rem<>mhrr that ha.ppenrd?
"1\'IINCEY: I remrmher som<>bod~· sta nding ov<'r me ~a.y mg ·Movr
nigg~>r, move .' I was on the floor brside the bed.
"HUST: Do you remembrr shooting anyonr or firing a gun?
" MINCEY : 'I' his is all I tan say without a lawyer.
" HUST : If you want a lawyrr now , I cannot talk to you any longer,
howrver, you don't have to an~wrr any que:,;ticn ~ you don't want to . Do
you st ill want to talk to me?
"MINCEY : (Shook hi:,; head in an affirma.tivr mannf\r.)
" HUST: What rbe can you remember'?
" MINCEY: I 'm gonna have to put. my head together. There are so
m any thing,.; I don 't. remrmber I like how did they grt into th<> apartment!
"RUST: How did who grt into the apartment."!
" MINCEY: Police.
" RUST: Did you :;rll somr narcotic" to the guy that wa:,; shot f
"MINCEY : Do you me, did he giw me ilome mon<>yY
"'BUST : Yes,

-·
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terTogation Mincey vainly asked Rust to desist. Moreover,
he complained several times that he was confused or unable
to think clearly, or that he . could answer more accurately
the next day. 18 But despite Mincey's entreaties to be let
"MINCEY: No.
"HUST: Did you give him n sample?
"MINCEY: What. do you rail a Ham pi<'?
"RUST: A small amount of drug or narcotics to test?
"MINCEY: I can't say without a lawye1·.
"HUST: Did anyone say police or narcs when thPy came into the
apartment?
"MINCEY: Let m<' get m~·~elf togrtht>r first. You srr, I'm not for
sure everything happened so fa~t. 1 can't. answrr at this time becauo;e
I don't. think so, but I ca.n't say for :,;ure. Some qtH'stions aren't . dear to
me at. the present time.
"HUST: Did you shoot. nil~'one?
"MINCEY: I can't sa.y. I have to see a lawyer." (Emphasis supplied.)
While some of Mincey'" answPr" srem relatively responsive to the questions, it mwst. be rememberc>d that Hust added the questions at a later
date, with the answers in front of him. SrP n. 12, supra. The reliability
of Rust's report is uncertain. For example, Hust claimed that immediately after Mincey first expresBrd a. desire to remain silent, Hust said
Mincey need not answer an~· quE'I'tions but Mincey responded by indicnting that he wanted to continue. There is no contemporaneous record
supporting Rust's statemmt that Mincey acted so inconsistently immediatrly after a,;serting hi:s wish not to respond further, nor did the nur:se who
was present. during the interrogation corroborate Hust. The Arizona.
Supreme Court apparently diHb<'lirved Hust in this respect, since it stated
that "after each indication from [Minceyl that he wanted to consult an
attorney or that. he wanted to Rtop answrring questions, the police officer
continued to question [him]." 115 Ariz., at 479, 566 P. 2d, at. 280 (emphasis supplied) .
18 In addition to thr statrment~ qnotrd inn. 17, supra., Mincey wrote at
various times during the int<>rrogntion: "Thrm !lrP a. lot of things tha.t
aren't clear," "Tha.t's why I hnvo to ha.vc time to rrdo f'Vf't-ything in my
mind," "I'm not for surr," and ·'I'm not ~uro a.~ of now." Hr also wrote:
" If its possible to get a lawf'r isici now. W<' ran fini&h thr talk. He
could direct me in the righf direction whrre as without a. la.w yrr I might
saw [.sic] something thinking that. it mean~ something cl~c . " And at

,4Jo
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alone, Hust ceased the interrogation only during intervals
when Mincey lost consciousuess or received medical treatment,
and after each such interruption returned relentlessly to his
task. The statements at issue were thus the result of virtually
continuous questioning of a seriously and painfully wounded
man on the edge of consciousness.
There were not present in this case some of the gross abuses
that have led the Court in other cases to find confessions involuntary, such as beat,ings, see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278, or "truth serums," see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 299.
But "the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an
unconstitutional inquisition." Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U. S., at 206. Determination of whether a statement is
involuntary "requires more than a mere color-matching of
cases." Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433, 442. It requires careful
evaluation of all the circumstances of the interrogation. 10
It is apparent from the record in this case that Mincey's
statements were not "the product of [his] free and rational
choice." Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U. S. 519, 521. To the
contrary, the undisputed evidence makes clear that Mincey
wanted not to answer Detective Hust. But Mincey was weakened by pain and shock, isolated from family, friends and legal
counsel. and barely conscious. and his will was simply overborne. Due process of law requires that statements obtained
as these were cannot be used in any way against a defendant
at his trial.

IV
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Arizona
Supreme Court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
another point. he wrote "Lets ra.p tC'tmarrow [sicl face to face. I can't
give fa.cts. If something ha ppins sic T I don't know about.."
10 E . g., Boulden v. Holman, 394 U. S. 478, 480; Clewis v. Texas , 38()
U. S. 707,. 708 ; Hnynes v, Wa,shington, 373 U.S . 503, 513-514.
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MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring.
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I join the opinion of the Court, which holds that

,

~

1.a.

petitioner's rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments have
been violat ed.

I write today to emphasize a point that is

illustrated by the instant cas e , but that applies more
generally to all cases in which we are asked to review Fourth
Amendment issues arising out of state criminal convictions.
It is far from clear that we would have granted certiorari
solely to resolve the Fifth Amendment issue in this case, for
that could have been resolved on federal habeas corpus.

With

regard to the Fourth Amendment issue, however, we had little
choice but to grant certiorari, because our decision in Stone

v. Powell, 428
of such issues.

u.s.

465 (1976), precludes federal habeas review

In Stone the Court held that, "where the State

has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a
Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence
obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was
introduced at his trial."

Id. at 494.

Because of this

holding, petitioner would not have been able to present to a
federal habeas court the Fourth Amendment claim that the Court
today upholds.
The additional responsibilities placed on this Court in the
wake of Stone become apparent upon examination of decisions of
the Arizona Supreme Court on the Fourth Amendment issue
presented here.

The Arizona court created its "murder scene

exception" in a 1971 case.
489 P.2d 44, 46-47.

State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407,

A year later, when the defendant in that

case sought federal habeas corpus relief, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the exception
could not be upheld under the Fourth Amendment.

Sample v.

Eyman, 469 F.2d 819, 821-822 (1972).

When the Arizona Supreme

Court next gave plenary consideration to the issue, prior to
our decision in Stone, it apparently felt bound by the Ninth
Circuit's Sample decision, although it found the case before it
to be distinguishable .

State v. Duke, 110 Ariz. 320,

, 518

p. 2d 57 0, 57 4 ( 19 7 4) .1
When the Arizona Supreme Court rendered its decision in
the instant case, however, it took a different approach.

The

decision, issued nearly a year after Stone, merely noted that
the Ninth Circuit had "disagreed" with the Arizona court's view
of the validity of the murder scene exception.
472,

n.4, 566 P.2d 273, 283 n.4 (1977).

effective "conflict" for us to resolve.
19.l(b).

115 Ariz.

It thus created an

Cf. Sup. Ct. Rule

If certiorari had not been granted, we would have

left standing a decision of the State's highest court on a
question of federal constitutional law that had been resolved
in a directly opposing way by the highest federal court having
special resposibility for the State.

Regardless of which

- 4 -

court's view of the Constitution was the correct one, such
nonuniformity on important Fourth Amendment questions is
obviously undesirable; it is as unfair to state propecutors and
judges -- who must make difficult determinations regarding what
evidence is subject to exclusion -- as it is to state criminal
defendants.
Prior to Stone v. Powell, there would have been no need to
grant certiorari in a case such as this, since the federal
habeas remedy would have been available to the defendant.
Indeed, prior to Stone petitioner here probably would not even
have had to utilize federal habeas, since the Arizona courts
were at that earlier time more inclined to follow the federal
constitutional pronouncements of the Ninth Circuit, as
discussed above.

But Stone eliminated the habeas remedy with

regard to Fourth Amendment violations, thus allowing state
court rulings to diverge from lower federal court rulings on
these issues and placing a correspondingly greater burden on
this Court to ensure uniform federal law in the Fourth
Amendment area.

At the time of Stone my Brother BRENNAN wrote that
"institutional constraints totally preclude any possibility
that this Court can adequately oversee whether state courts
have properly applied federal law."
(dissenting opinion}; see id. at 534.

428

u.s.

at 526

Becaus ~

of these

constraints, we will often be faced with a Hobson's choice in
cases of less than national significance that could formerly
have been left to the lower federal courts:

either to deny

certiorari and thereby let stand divergent state and federal
decisions with regard to Fourth Amendment rights; or to grant
certiorari and thereby add to our calendar, which many believe
is already overcrowded, cases that might better have been
resolved elsewhere.

In view of this problem and others,2 I

hope that the Court will at some point reconsider the wisdom of
Stone v. Powell.

- 6 -

Footnotes
1.

In its Mincey opinion, 115 Ariz. 472,

, 566 P.2d

273, 283 (1977), the Arizona Supreme Court cited as involving
the murder scene exception one case other than Sample and
Duke.

State ex rel. Berger v. Superior Court, 110 Ariz. 281,

517 P.2d 1277 (1974).

The two sentence opinion in the latter

case, however, provides no explanation of the underlying facts
and does not cite to either the Arizona court's or the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Sample.

There is thus no way to

determine whether the situation in Berger was in any way
comparable to those in Sample, Duke, and Mincey, nor any way to
determine whether the Berger court simply ignored the Ninth
Circuit's Sample decision or instead, as in Duke (decided just
two weeks after Berger), viewed Sample as distinguishable.

2.

The Stone holding has not eased the burden on the lower

federal courts as much as the Stone majority might have hoped,
since those courts have had to struggle over what this Court
meant by "an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a
Fourth Amendment claim," 428 U.S. at 494.

See,

~,

Gates v.

Henderson, 568 F.2d 830 (CA2 1977); United States ex rel.
Petillo v. New Jersey, 562 F.2d 903 (CA3 1977); O'Berry v.
Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (CAS 1977).

Justice Powell,
TM has used Mincey as a vehicle for making a cheap
shot at Stone v. Powell.

Through all sorts of speculation

about the motivation of state supreme court judges in
deciding federal constitutional questions, and an analysis
of several Arizona cases decided before and after Stone,
TM seems to imply quite strongly that state court judges
xii are being recalcitrant in following federal habeas

decisions because they are willing to risk it that this
Court will not grant cert.

Alternatively, TM says the

effect of Stone is to increase the burden on this Court.
An interesting point is TM's suggestion that this
Court granted cert. in Mincey because the faiaxai Fourth
Amendment question could k not be reviewed on federal
habeas.

I wrote the pool memo in Mincey, and (perhaps

out of naivete)

th~navailabi~i.t ~

not even enter my

of federal habeas did

~~~)

d.

I do not know whether it entered

the consideration of any of the Justices, other than TM.
When an issue looks difficult or unimportant, this Court
sometimes seems to choose the option of leaving a case to
federal habeas.

But when it is an important issue on which

state and federal courts have ruled, and ruled differently,
the conflict motivates the Court to grant.
case had gone through federal habeas,

it~s

Even if this
(or another case

raising the murder scene exception issue) would have reached
this Court at some point.

2.
Despite my view that TM's concurrence is slanted
a
and/highly inappropriate use of a Justice's prereogative to
write a concurring opinion, or perhaps because of xkHx
this view, I do not think you should counter with a concurring
opinion defending Stone.

It would turn into a side-show.

TM's views are his wholly personal w speculation about
the effects of Stone v. Powell, and I would hope that you
would not think it appropriate to engage in likH a rejoinder.
If you would like to circulate something suggesting
your views and stating that you do not intend to respond,
that would be a different matter.
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2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 77- 5353
Rufus Junior Mincey, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiora 1
v.
the Supreme Co rt
State of Arizona.
Arizona.
[May - , 1978]
MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the
On the afternoon of October 28, 1974, undercover police
officer Barry Headricks of the Metropolitan Area Narcotics
Squad knocked on the door of an apartment in Tucson, Ariz.,
occupied by the petitioner. Rufus Mincey. Earlier in the day,
Officer Headricks had allegedly arranged to purchase a quantity of heroin from Mincey and had left, ostensibly to obtain
money. On his return he was accompanied by nine other
plainclothes policemen and a deputy county attorney. The
door was opened by John Hodgman, one of three acquaintances
of Mincey who were in the living room of the apartment.
Officer Headricks slipped inside and moved quickly into the
bedroom. Hodgman attempted to slam the door in order to
keep the other officers from entering. but was pushed back
against the wall. As the police entered the apartment, a rapid
volley of shots was heard from the bedroom. Officer
Headricks emerged and collapsed on the floor. When other
officers entered the bedroom they found Mincey lying on the
floor, wounded and semiconscious. Officer Headricks died a
few· hours later in the hospitaL
The petitioner was indicted for murder, assault. 1 and three
counts of narcotics offenses. He was tried at a single trial and
The assault cbrge was bar;ed on the wounding of a. person in the living
room who was hit by ~L bullet that came through the wall,
1

.1_8 MAY

1~/&_
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convicted on all the charges. At his trial and on appeal, he
contended that evidence used against him had been unlawfully
seized from his apartment without a warrant and that statements used to impeach his credibility were inadmissible
because they had not been made voluntarily. The Arizona
Supreme Court reversed the murder and assault convictions on
state-law grounds, 2 but affirmed the narcotics convictions. 115
Ariz. 472, 566 P. 2d 273. It held that the warrantless search
of a homicide scene is permissible under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments and that Mincey's statements wer-e
voluntary. We granted certiorari to consider these substantial
constitutional questions. -U.S.-.

I
The first question presented is whether the search of
Mincey's apartment was constitutionally permissible. After
the shooting, the narcotics agents, thinking that other persons
in the apartment might have bren injured, looked about
quickly for other victims. They found a young woman
wounded in the bedroom closet and Mincey apparently unconscious in the bedroom. as well as Mincey's three acquaintances
(one of whom had bern wounded in the head) in the living
room. Emergency assistance was requested and some medical
aid administered to Officer Heaclricks. But the a.gents refrained from furthrr investigation. pursuant to a Tucson
Police Department directivr that police officers should not
uwestigate incidents in which they arr involved. They neither
searched further nor seized any evidence; they merely guarded
the suspects and the premises.
Within 10 minutes, hm.vevcr. homicide detectives who had
heard a radio report of the shooting arrived and took charge
The

~tate

appc-!httr court lwld ihnt the jury had brcn improperly
on criminal int<:>nt. It a.prwar:; from tho rceorcl in this ca.se
that tlw rPtnal of the prlit ion<'r on t lw mmdPr nnd n~sault rhargrs was:
~taycd. hy the tn_
al ronrt ·tfter rPrtiorari wa~ granted. by this Court.
2

m~truct<'d
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of the investigation. They supervised the removal of Officer Headricks and the suspects, trying to make sure that the
scene was disturbed as little as possible, and then proceeded to
gather evidence. Their search lasted four days,'1 during which
period the entire apartment was searched, photographed, and
diagrammed. The officers opened drawers, closets, and cupboards, and inspected their contents; they emptied clothing
pockets; they dug bullet fragments out of the walls and floors;
they pulled up sections of the carpet and removed them for
examination. Every item in the apartment was closely examined and inventoried, and two to three hundred objects were
seized. In short. Mincey's apartment was subjected to an
exhaustive and intrusive search. No warrant was ever
obtained.
The petitioner's pretrial motion to suppress the fruits of
this search was denied after a hearing. Much of the evidence
introduced against. him at trial (including photographs and
diagrams, bullets and shell casings, guns. narcotics, and narcotics paraphernalia) was tlw product of the four-day search
of his apartment. On appeal. the Arizona Supreme Court
reaffirmed previous decisions in which it had held that the
warrantless search of the scene of a homicide is constitutionally permissible. 4 It stated its ruling as follows:
"We hold a reasonable, warrantless search of the scene of
a homicide-or of a serious personal injury with likelihood of death where there is reason to suspect foul play3 The police also returned to tlw n,partmf'nt in November 1974. at the
rcque:-;t of i he petitioner'H landlord, to remove propert)' of the petit.ioner
that. remained 111 the apartment after his !rase had expired on Ortober 31.
1 State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 489 P. 2d 44: State ex rel. Berger v.
Superior Court, 110 Ariz. 2~1, 517 P. 2d 1277; State v. DukP, 110 Ariz.
:~20 , 51H P. 2d 570. The Conrt of Appeals for the Ninth Cirruit reversed
the d<·nial of a petJtion for a writ of habeas rorpu~ filed b)' the defendant
who~<' conviction was upheld in State v. Sample, supra, on the ground,
inter alia, that the warrnntless search of the homicidc scene violated the·
FotJl!tb nud Fouctcenth Amendment::>·. Sample v.. Eyman, 469 F. 2cl8IK

I
I

l
I
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does Hot violate the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution where the law enforcement officers
were legally on the premises in the first instance. . . .
For the search to be reasonable, the purpose must be
limited to determining the circumstances of death and the
scope must not exceed that purpose. The search must
also begin within a reasonable period following the time
when the officials first learn of the murder (or potential
murder)." 115 Ariz., at 482, 566 P. 2d, at 283.
Since the investigating homicide detectives knew that Officer
Headricks was seriously injured, began the search promptly
upon their arrival at the apartment. and searched only for
evidence either establishing the circumstances of death . or
"relevant to motiv8 and intent or knowledge (narcotics, e. g.),"
id., at 483. 566 P. 2d, at 284, the court found that the warra.ntJess search of the petitioner's apartment had not violated the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
We cannot agree. The Fourth Amendment proscribes all
unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that "searches conducted outside the judicial process.
without prior approval by judge or magistrate. are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to
a. few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."
Katz v. United States, 389 P. S. 347, 357; see also South
/)akota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 381 (POWELL. J .. concurr~ng); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443. 481;
I'ale v. LoU?.siana, 399 F. S. 30, 34; Terry Y. Oh1'o, 392 e. S.
1, 20; Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 705. The
Arizona Supreme Court did not hold that the search of the
petitioner's apartment fell withi11 any of the exceptions to the
warrant requirenwnt previously recognized by this Court. but
rather that the search of a homicide scene should be recognized as an adclitiollal exception.
1
Several reasons are advanced by the State t.o meet its "burdPn . .. to sho\Y the existence of such an exceptional situation''

I
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as to .i ustify creating a IH?w Pxception to the warrant requirement. See Vale v. Lou1:siana, supra, at 34; Jeffers Y. United
States, 342 r. S. 48, 51. None of these reasons, however,
persuades us of the validity of the getwric exception delineated
by the Arizona Supreme Court.
The first contention is that the search of the petitioner's
apartment did not invade any constitutionally protected right
of privacy. Sec Katz v. U11ited States, supra. This argument
appea.rs to have two prongs. On the one hall(!. the State
urgf's that by shooting Officer Headricks, Mincey forfeited
any reasonable expectation of privacy in his apartment. We
have recently rejected a similar waiver argument in Michigan
v. Tyler, LJ. S. - . (slip op. 5-6); it suffices here to say
that this reasoning would impermissibly con viet the suspect
even before the evidence against him was gathered." On the
other hand, the State contends that the police e11try to arrest
Mincey was so great an invasion of his privacy that the additional intrusion caused by the search was coiJstitutionally
irrelevant. But this claim is hardly tenable in light of the
extensive nature of this search. It is one thing to say that
one who is legally taken into police custody has a lessened
right of privacy in his person. SeP United States v. Edwards,
415 U. S. 800, 808-809; United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S.
218. It is quite another to argue that he also has a lessened
right of privacy in his entire house. Indeed this very argument was rejected whe11 it was advanced to support the
warrantless search of a dwelling where an arrest occurred as
"incident" to the arrest of its occupant. Chimel v. California,
395 U. S. 752, 766 n. 12. Thus, this search cannot be justified
on the ground that no constitutionally protected right of
pnvacy was mvaded .
r. t'vlorrovrr, th1~ rat10nak would bP inapphcablr if a homicide occurred
at the homr of the victim or of a ~trangc>r, ypt. tlw Arizona ca~e~ indicate
that. n wa.rrnntlrtiR H<'a reb in ~uch a cao;e would al:so br permi~::;iblc under
thr " murdC'r ~;ceue rxcPption ." Cf. State v. Sample, 8Upra, at 409, 48!)
P . 2d, ut 46

77-535:{-0PINlON

MINCEY v. AHTZONA

6

The State's second argument in support. of Arizona's categorica.l exception to the warrant requirement is tha.t a possible homicide presents an emergency situation demanding
immediate action. We do not question the right of the police
to respond to emergency situations. ~umerous state" and
fedeml 7 cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment
does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries
and searches when they reasonably believe that a person
within is in need of immediat.e aiel. Simila.rly, when the police
come upon the scene of a homicide they may make a prompt
warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims
or if a killer is still on the premises. Cf. Michigan v. Tyler,
supra, a t - (slip op. 9-10). "The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would
otherwise be illegal conduct absent an exigency or emergency."
Wayne v. United States, 115 U. S. App. D. C. 234, 241, 318
F. 2d 205. 212 (opinion of Burger. J.). And the police ma.y
seize any cviclc~llce that is in pla.in view during the course of
G E. g., People v. Hill, 12 Cal. 3d 7:n. 528 P. 2d 1; Patrick v. State, 227
A. 2d 486 (DeL 1967); People v. Brooks, 7 Illl. App. 3d 767, 289 N . E.
2d 207; Ma.te!J Y. State, 244 N. E. 2d fi50 (Ind.); Davis v. State, 236 Md.
389 . 204 A. 2d 76; State v. Hardin. 51H P. 2d 151 (Nev.); State v. Gosser,
50 N. J. 438,236 A. 2cl a77; People''· Mitchell, 39 K. Y. 2d 17::l, :347 N. K
2d 607; State v. Pi1·e:s, 55 Wi~. 2d 597,201 K. W. 2d 153. OtbN cases are
collected in ~ote . The Emergeney Doctrine, Civil Search and Seizure , and
the Fourth Amendment, 43 Ford. L. Hev. 571, 5S4 n. 12. See al,.:;o ALI
Model Code of Pre-arraignmt'nt Procedure § SS 260.5 (Prop. Off. Draft
J 975) . By riting the~e cases and those in thP not~, following, of cour~c,
WP do not ml'<lll to approve t.he spc·cific holding of each ca~r.
7 E. g., Root v. Ga'uper. 438 F. 2d :361, 364-365 (CAS); United States v.
Barone, 3:)0 F. 2d 54;3 (CA2); Wayne v. United States. 115 U. S. App.
D , C. 234, 23S-24:l, :n~ F. :2cl 205. 209-214 (opinion of BurgN, .T.);
United States v . James. 40H F. Supp. 527 (SD i\li~::-:.) ; United States ex
rel. Parson 1' . Anderson. :l54 F. Supp. lOfiO, lONfi-1087 (Del.), nff'cl, 481
F . 2d 94 (CA3): ~ ee Warden Y. Haydeu , 387 U . S. 294, 29H-299: McDonald v. United States , 335 U. S. 451, 456; Johnson v. United States, 333,

~ r.

s. 10, 14-15.

I
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th cir legitim a tR em0rge ncy activities. Michigan v. Tyler,
supra, a t - (slip op. 9); Coolidge Y. Xe1u Hampsh1"re, supra,
at 465-466.
But a warrantless search must be "strictly circumscribed by
the exigenci<'s which .)us~ify its initiatiou," Terry v. Ohio, 392 \ ~""""
U. S .. at 25-26, and It Simply cannot be contended that this
search was justified by any emergency threatening life or limb.
All the persons in Mincey's apartment had been located before
the investigating homicide officers arrived there and began
their search. And a four-da.y search that included opening
dresser drawers and ripping up carpets can hardly be rationalized in terms of the legitimate concerns that justify an emergency search.
Third, the State points to the vital public interest in the
prompt investigation of the extremely serious crime of murder. No one can doubt the importanc<' of this goal. But
the public interest in the investigation of other serious crimes
is comparable. If the warrantless search of a homicide scene
is reasonable, why not the warrantless search of the scene of a
rape, a robbery, or a burglary'? "No consideration relevant
to the Fourth Amendment suggests any point of rational limitation" of such a doctrine. Chirnel v. California, supra, at
766.
Moreover, the mere fact that law enforcement may be made
more efficient call never by itself justify disregard of the
Fourth Amendment. Cf. Coolidge Y. 1\'ew Hampshire, supra,
at 481. The investigation of crime would always be simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth Amendment rpflect~ the view of those who wrote the Bill of
Rights that tlw privacy of a person's home and property may
not be totally sacrificed in the name of ma.ximurn simplicity
in enforcement of the criminal law. See United States v.
Chadwick, 433 t:. S. 1, C}-11. For this reason, warrants are
generally required to search a. person's home or his person
t~nlesf) "thE' exigencies of the situation" make the needs of law:
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enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is
objectively reasonable unde•· the Fourth Amendment. M cDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456; Johnson v. United
States, 333 U. S. 10, 14-15. See, e. g., Chimel v. California,
supra (search of arrested suspect and area within his control
for weapons or evidence); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
298-300 ("hot pursuit." of fleeing suspect); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 770-771 (imminent destruction of evidence); see also supra, at 6-7.
Except for the fact that the offense under investigation was
a homicide, there w<>re no exigent circumstances in this case,
as, indeed, the A1·izona Supreme Court recognized. 115 Ariz.,
at 482, 566 P. 2d, at 283. Ther0 was no indication that evidence would be lost. destroyed or removed during the time
required to obtain a search warrant. Indeed, the police guard
at the apartment minimized that possibility. And there is ]
no suggestion that a search warrant could not easily and conveniently have been obtaiMcl. We declin<> to bold that the
seriousness of the offellSC' under investigation itself creates
exigent circumstances of th0 kind that under the Fourth
Amendment justify a. warra11tlcss search.
Finally, the State argues that the "murder scene exception"
is constitutionally permissible b<>causc it is narrowly confined
by the guidelines s<>t forth in the decision of the Arizona
Supreme Court, sec supra, at 3-4.' In light of tlw extensive
search that took place in this case it may be questioned what
protection the guidelines afford a person in whose home a
homicide or assault occurs. Jndeecl, these so-called guidelines
are hardly so rigidly confining as the State seems to assert.
They confer unbridled discretion upon the individual officer
to interpret such terms as "reasonable ... search," "serious
~ Thr Statr al:-;o rrltr~ on t.hr fact that ob8Prvance of the;;e g11idrlincs can
be enforced by a mot ion to :-;up pres~ evidmre. But the Fourth Amendment "Is designed to prcv<'nt, not ;;imply to rrdrr:-;:-;, unlawful polico tLction."
Ch11nel v California, ;)95 (J S. 752, 7o6 n. 12.
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personal in.iury with likelihood of death where there is reason
to suspect foul play," and "reasonable period." It is precisely
this kind of judgmental assessment of the reasonableness and
scope of a proposed search that the Fourth Amendment requires be made by a nrutral a11d objective magistra.te, not a
police officer. See. e. g., United States Y. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297. ~16; Coolidge ,.. .\'ew Hampshire,
supra, at 449-453; Mancus1. Y. DeForle, 392 U.S. 364, 371;
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 "G. S. 471, 481-482.
It may well be that the circumstances described by the
Arizona Supreme Court would usually be constitutionally
sufficient to warraut a search of substantial scope. But the
Fourth Amendment requires that this judgment in each case
be made in the first instance by a neutral rnagistratc.
"The point of thP Fourth Amendment, which often is
not grasped by zealous officers. is not that it denies law
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protectiou consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged
by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, supra,
at 13- 14.

I

In sum, we hold that the "murder scene exception" created
by the Arizona Supreme Court is inconsistent with the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendmrnts-that. the warrantless search of
Mincey's apartment was not constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide had recently occurred there.u

II
Since thrre will presumably be a new trial in this case, 10 it
u To what extent, if any, the evicl<·nrt' found in Miucey's apartmt>nt was;
permissibly seized undPr C'lltablishcd Fourth Amendment standards will
be for thE' Arizona courts lo re:~olve on remand .
Jo fiee abo n. 2, supra.

I
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is appropriate to consider also the petitioner's contention that
statements he rnade from a hospital bed were involuntary, and
therefore could not constitutionally be used against him at
his trial.
Mincey was brought to the hospital after the shooting and
taken immediately to the emergency room where he was
examined and treated. He had sustained a wound in his hip,
resulting in damage to the sciatic nerve and partial paralysis
of his right leg. Tubes were inserted into his throat to help
him breathe, and through his nose into his stomach to keep '
him from vomiting; a catheter was inserted into his bladder.!
He received various drugs, and a device was attached to his
arm so that he could be fed intravenously. He was then
taken to the intensive care unit.
At about eight o'clock that evening, Detective Hust of the
Tucson Police Department came to the intensive care unit to
interrogate him. Mincey was unable to talk because of the
tube in his mouth, and so hP responded to Detective Rust's
questions by writing answers on pieces of paper provided by
tho hospital." Hust told Mincey he was under arrest for the
murder of a police officer, gave him the warnings required by
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, and began to ask questions
about the events that had taken place in Mincey's apartment
a few hours earlier. Although Mincey asked repea.tedly that
the interrogation stop until he could get a lawyer, Hust continued to question him until almost midnight.
After a pretrial hearing. see Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368,
the trial court found that Mincey had responded to this inter11 Becan~e of thr way 111 which the interrogation wa:; conducted, the only
coatemporaneons record coni:II~ted of Mincey's written an::;werH. Hu~1 testified that the nrxt day he went over thi::; clocunwnt and made a f'pw notes
to help hun recon::;t.ruc1 the convpr::;ation. ln a written rPport dated about
a week later. Hu:st tran~cribed Mince~·'R au:;wrr::; and addPd thP question~
he be!Ievrd he had a::;krd. It wa~; thi::; writtE'n report that was u::;ed to
cro~:,;-rxamine Mincey at his subsequent. trial

'.•
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rogation voJuntarily. 1 '! vYhen Mincey took the witness stand
at his trial his statements in response to Detective Rust's
questions were used in an effort to imprach his testimony in
several respects. 1" On appeal. tlw Arizona Supreme Court
indicated its belief that because Detective Rust had failed to
honor Mincey's request for a lawyer. the statements would
have been inadmissible as part of the prosecution's case in
chief. Miranda v. Arizona, supra. But, relying on Harris v.
New York, 401 1;. S. 222, a11d Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714,
it held that since the trial court's finding of voluntariness was
not "clear[ly] ami manifest[ly _I" 0rroneous the statements
were properly used for purposes of impeachment. 115 Ariz.,
at 479-480, 566 P. 2d, at 280-281.
Statements made by a defendant in circumstances violating
the strictures of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, are admissible for
impeachment if their "trustworthiness ... satisfies legal standftrds." Harris v. Xew Y01·k, supra, at 224; Oregon v. Hass,
1

~ Thr t.rial court made no findiug~ of fart, nor did it make a ~pecifir
finding of voluntarinr~~. aml thr peiitionc·r contend~ that adrni;;;;ion of the
~tatement~ t hrrrforr viola.trd Jackson "· DPIIIW. :~7R U. S. :36R. We agree
with the Arizona Supreme Court, howPv<•r, that the finding of voluntarine;;s "appearr;;l from thr reconl with IJllmi~takable elarit~· ." Sims v.
Georgia, :385 U. S. 53R , 5-l-!. Thr pPt it ionrr had originall~· moved to
:;upprNis hi~ wnttf•n nn::-wc'r::< to Hust'::< questiou~ on two grounds: that
the~· had been rlirited in violation of Miranda \'.Arizona, 3H4 1.1. S. 436,
and that they had hern involuutar~ · . During tlw )waring. thr prosecution
~ t1pula.tPd that the an~wer::< would lw ll~Pd onl~· to imprach tlw prtitionrr
1f he took the witness stand. An.1· violatwn of Miranda thus brcamr
1rrelrvant. Ore(Jon v. !lass, -1,20 ll. S. 7J4; llan·is "· Neu• York, 401 U.S.
222. The te:;timony and the hrirf~:< aud nrguments of couucel wrre thrre-aftrr directed solely to whether tbr a.ni:\wrrs had been voluntarily given,
and th<' eonrt specificall~· n110d that they would be ndmi~sible for impeachmrnt purpo,;~ only. The court tl111~< necessarily lwlcl that Mincey'~ re~ pon::;(~ to Hu~t 's mterrogation wrrr ,·oluntnry.
'"In light of our holding that !\finery's hospital statement~ were not
voluntanl~· give11, 1l 18 unnerf'::<"HIT to rrarh hi::; altemate content.ion that
lheJr u~P again::;t, him was Jmpermi::;siblr brrau;;r they were not sufficiently·
incon;;istrnt with his trial testimony.
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supra, at. 722. But. any criminal trial use against. a defendant
of his involuntary statement. is a denial of due process of law
"even though there is ample evidence aside from the confession to support the conviction." Jackson v. Denno, supra, at
377; Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 518; Lynumn v.
Illinois, 372 U. S. 528, 537; Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181.
190; see Chapman v. California, 386 U . S. 18. 23 and n. 8.
If, therefore, Mincey's statements to Detective Rust were not
"the product of a rational intellect and a free will," Townsend
v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 307; Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S.
199, 208, his conviction cannot stand. In making this critical
determination, we are not bound by the Arizona Supreme
Court's holding that the statements were voluntary. Instead,
this Court is under a. duty to make an independent evaluation
of the record. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U. S. 737, 741742; Haynes v. Washington, supra, at 515-516.
It is hard to imagine a situation less conducive to the exercise of "a rational intellect and a free will" than Mincey's.
He had been seriously wounded just a few hours earlier, and
had arrived at the hospital "depressed almost to the point of
coma," according to his attending physician. Although he
had received some treatment. his condition at the time of
Rust's interrogation was still sufficiently serious that he was
iu the intensive care unit.''' He complained to Rust that the
pa.ill in his leg was "unbearable." He was evidently confused
and unable to think clea.rly about either the events of that
afternoon or the circumstances of his interrogation, since some
of his written a.11swers were on their face not entirely
coherent.'" Finally, while Mincey was being questioned he
,., A nm;;? tr~H1rd at the ~uppre~·::;ion hearing that the devicr u::;cd to
aid Minr<:>y 's rr;;piration was reserved for "more critical" patient::;. Moreovrr. :\1inrry appnr<:>ntly remained hoSJ1itnlized for nlmo::;t n month nftcr
the shooting. According to docket rntrir~ in the trial court hi::; arraignmrn t. w:1::; po::;tponed sevrra l times because he was still in the hospital ; he
was not :trmigned until November 26, 1974.
P ,Fqr exam plr, two of the answerR written by Mincey were: "Do yoLL

•
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was lying on his back on a hospital bed, encumbered by tubes,
needles, and breathing apparatus. He was, in short, "at the
complete mercy" of Detective Rust, unable to escape or resist
the thrust of Rust's interrogation. Cf. Beecher v. Alabama,
389 U. S. 35, 38.
In this debilitated and helpless coudition, Mincey clearly
expressed his wish not to be interrogated. As soon as Rust's
questions turned to the details of the afternoon's events,
Mincey wrote: "This is all I can say without a lawyer.'' Rust
nonetheless continued to question him. and a nun:e who was
present suggested it would be best if Mincey answered. Mincey gave unresponsive or uninformative answers to several
more questions, a.nd then said again tha.t he did not want to
talk without a lawyer. Rust ignored that request a.nd another
made immediately thereafter.'" Indeed, throughout the inme Did he give me ;;orne money (no)" and '·Every body know E ery
body." And Mincey apparently belic··ed he was being que;;timwd by several different policemen, not Hu~t alone ; although it. wa;; Rust who told
Mincey he had killed a policeman, later in the interrogation Mincey
indicated he thought it was someonp ebe.
H• In his reconstruction of the interrogation, see n. 11 , supra, Rust
stated that, aftE'r hE' a;:;kE'd Mincey some questions to try to identify one
of the other victims, tlw following en~m·d:
"RUST: ... What do you rE>member that happened?
" MINCEY : I remPmbPr ;;omE>body standiPg over me saying 'Move·
nigger, move.' I was on the floor bc;:;idE> ihP bed.
"RUST: Do you remembE>r ::;hooting anymw or firing a gun?
"MINCEY: This is all I can ~ay without a lawyer .
"RUST: If you want a lawyer now, I cannot taJk to you any longer,
however, yon don't have to an~wer any que::;ticns you don't want to. Do
you still want to talk to me?
" MINCEY: (Shook his head in an affirmative manner.)
" IIUST: What else can you remember'?
"MINCEY : I'm gonna have to put my head together. Thc•rc• are so
many things I don't. remember I like how did they get. into tlw apartment?.'
"HUST: How did who get into thl' apartm0nt '?
"MINCEY: Polirc.
"HUST: Did you sell some nntcotirs to the guy that was shot'?.'
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terrogation Mincey vainly asked Rust to desist. Moreover,
he complained several times that he was confused or unable
to think clearly, or that he could answer more accurately
thP next day." But despite' Mincey's entreaties to be let
"MINCEY: Do you mt>, did hr give me some money?
"RUST: Yrs.
"MINCEY: No.
"RUST: Did you give him n l':tmple?
"MINCEY: Wlmt, do you eall n. ~>ampl<.''?
'·RUST: A small amount of drug or narco1ics lo test?
';MINCEY: l can't say v•ithout a lawyer.
"RUST: Did anyone f'il)' polier or nnrrl' whrn th<'y rnme into the
apartment?
"MINCEY: Let tn<.' get mysrlf iog<'t·h<'r fir:-;t. You see, I'm not for
sure everything happened so fa~l. I can't. lUlt;W<'r at this time because
r don't think HO, but I can't. ~ay for ;;ure. Somr qurstions aren't clear to
mo at l he prrsrnt time.
"RUST: Did you shoot nn~·mw?
"MINCEY: I can't say.! have to ~>ee a lawyer." (Empha~i;,; Hupplird.)
Wlule some of Minc<'y'~ an»wN~ ~<·<·m relat ivt'ly I'<'Spon:-;iv<' lo 1hr qurstwn~, it muHt be remrmb!'rrd that Hu:-;t acldrd th<' qu!':;tions at a later
datr , with the an ·wers in front of him. Ser 11. 11. supra. The reliabilit)·
of HuHt ':; report io; unc<'rtain. For exam pi<', Ilust rlaimed thai immedmlely after MitH'<'Y first rxpr<'~RPd a. dP~in• to remain :-;iiPnt. Hu~t ;,;aid
MincPy need not answer an)' qu<~tion.~ but. l\linr<')' re:;ponded b~· inclicalmg that lw want<'cl io cont illlH'. Tlwre i~ no eont rmponlllPOUH record
~upportmg Hust 's Htat!'ment that ~finery n.ried ~o inron:;i:<t!'ntl~· immediatrly aJier n<'sPrting hil" wish not to n•spond furill('r, nor did the nur::;p who
wa.s prrsent. during tlw int!'rrogation rorrohorat<' Hust. Tht' Arizona
Supreme Court npparrntl~· di:<I.JPlit•vecl Hu:<t in thi:-; rt':iJW<'t. sin<'!' it ~iatrcl
that "aft<'r each indirHtion from I :\finrey I that he wanted to rOJl~ult an
attonu•y or that ll(' wantPd to stop unf:'weriug (Jil<'stion~, tlw polirr ofi-irt'r
rontmued to que;,;twn I him]." 115 Ariz., at 479 , 5fi6 l'. 2d, at. 2HO (<'mpha;,;Js supplird) .
' 7 In addition 1o the :;talt'tnl'nts quol<'d inn. 16, supra, :\Tince~· wrotP at
various times during the interrogation: "TIH•ro ar<.' a. lot of thing:-; that
aren 't clrar,'' "Thnt'" why I lmve to han• time to rP<Io <'V<'rything in my
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alone, Hust ceased the interrogation only during intervals
when Mincey lost cousciousness or received medical treatment,
and after each such interruption returned relentlessly to his
task. The statements at issue were thus the result of virtually
continuous questioning of a seriously and painfully wounded
man on the edge of consciousness.
There were not present i11 this case some of the gross abuses
that have led the Court ill other cases to find confessions involuntary, such as beatings, see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S.
278, or "truth serums," see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 299.
But "the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an
unconstitutioual inquisition." Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U. S., at 206. Determination of whether a statement is
involuntary "requires more than a mere color-matching of
cases." Reck v. Pate, 367 P. S. 433, 442. It requires careful
evaluation of all thf' circumstances of the interrogation.' 8
It is apparent from the record in this case that Mincey's
statements were not "the product of lhisj free and rational
choice." Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U. S. 519, 521. To the
contrary, the undisputed evidence makes clear that Mincey
wanted not to answer Detective Rust. But Mincey was weakened by pain and shock. isolatf'd from family, friends and legal
counsel, and barely conscious. and his will was simply overborne. Due process of law requires that statements obtained
as these were cannot be used in any way against a defendant
at his trial.
mind ," '' I 'm not for sure," a.nd " I'm not ,;nrEI as of now ." He also wrote:
" If 11 s po:-;sible t.o gpt a lawer [sic I now. We can finish the talk. He
could direct me in the right direction where as without a law~·pr I might
saw [sic] somPthing thinking that. it mean~ ::;omething Pbe." And at
another point. he wrote " Lets ra.p tomarrow [sic]. fa.cc to fac<'. I ra.n't
give fact s. If something happin~ rsicl I don't know about.."
' ~ E . g .. Boulde11 , .. llolman, ~9-J. U. S. 478, 480 : Clewis v. Tnas, :3R5
:([. S. 707, 708; llaynes v. Washington., 373 U. S. 503, 513-514.
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IV
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Arizona
Supreme Court is reversed and the case is remanded for fur~
ther proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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